Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) for Health Technology Assessment (HTA) are a 3 key means by which national governments have responded to the challenge of ensuring 4 equitable public access to a new range of medicines and treatment options within the 5 context of limited national budgets for healthcare. In this paper, we apply a regulatory 6 governance frame to the study of the Swedish process for HTA. Based on qualitative 7 interviews with key institutional stakeholders, we suggest that the major challenge for 8
Swedish IRAs for HTA is successfully communicating nationally produced research 9 outputs to the regional authorities responsible for the delivery of health services. We 10 conclude that a regulatory governance approach to the analysis of national processes for 11 HTA has the capacity to draw attention to a new range of challenges and issues which 12 have direct relevance to improving the conduct of HTA within national regulatory spaces. 13 Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (TLV) in Sweden and the National Institute for Health 42 and Care Excellence (NICE) in England. These IRAs produce evaluations of new health 43 technologies that integrate a range of economic, epidemiological and public health 44 evidence for the purpose of supporting policies on reimbursement, pricing, and the use of 45 technologies in clinical practice. In principle, these agencies provide more legitimate, 46 transparent and accountable methods and processes through which governments can 47 respond to pressures associated with delivering efficient and equitable public access to 48 new health technologies. For the future, the role of IRAs for HTA within national policy 49 making processes is likely to expand as a wider and more sophisticated array of treatment 50 options becomes available to patients, thus placing additional demands on national health 51 care budgets. 52 53 Despite their common remit, national IRAs for HTA exhibit diverse characteristics. 54 Across the European Union (EU), for example, member states (MSs) have established a 55 variety of dissimilar IRAs that utilize and apply a broad range of methods, processes and 56 evidential requirements for evaluating the benefits and costs of health technologies. 57 Typically, these divergences have prompted wider research initiatives and policy agendas 58 for the harmonization of HTA methods and processes across the EU. Such agendas 59 emphasize the benefits of adapting evaluations of individual technologies for cross border 60 use, and developing systematic approaches for evaluating the efficacy of individual 61 technologies [14, 15] . At the European level, the proliferation of national HTA agencies 62 has produced interest in cooperation and the exchange of HTA knowledge for the 63 purpose of reducing expenditure and the duplication of work programs [16, 17, 18] . At 64 the industry level too, there is support from major pharmaceutical companies for a 65 harmonization of HTA methods for the purpose of producing nationally transferable 66 results [19, 20] . Policy analysts have also suggested the establishment of a European 67 drug pricing and reimbursement agency similar to the European Medicines Agency 68 (EMA) [21] . Further, they have also argued that comparative efficacy data should have a 69 formal role in European drug approvals; and that European authorities should collaborate 70 with national HTA agencies towards the better congruence of licensing and 71 reimbursement requirements [22] . globalization, yet markets are not [33] . In other words, manufacturing practices for 92 pharmaceuticals have been standardized to a very high degree, but individual nation 93 states remain the monopolistic buyers in the largest markets, and so practices for HTA 94 are mostly national [32] . Thus, in the health care sector, there is increased scope for 95 policy mechanisms and innovations to become more political than technical, and more 96 parochial than structural at the national level [34, 25] [4, 5, 6] . In terms of HTA, some 115 comparative studies offer statistical and largely descriptive reports that highlight data on 116 a number of countries assumed to constitute a coherent class, analyzing the impact of 117 HTA on policymaking across national contexts [7, 8, 9, 10] . Others offer collections of 118 national case studies, describing institutions, roles and responsibilities. Some compare 119 national studies emphasizing themes like competition and privatization. And others often 120 take a specific medical theme as the focus of their analysis, such as oncology or diabetes 121 [11, 12, 13] . 122
In this way, comparative approaches also tend to focus on functional accounts of single  123  national IRAs, like TLV, HAS or NICE, assuming that these are comparable  124  organizations and the sole sources of power and legitimacy within the wider regulatory  125 domain. Here, they often press distinctions between HTA as a process of providing new 126 knowledge, or the structured assessment of a health-care technology; and HTA as an 127 appraisal process that is more context specific, and which converts the analysis into 128 policy advice [26] . [37] . Futhermore, the historical, political and cultural content of the 176 national decision making environment, its relation to the use and mix of particular 177 agencies and methods of operation, are also relevant to the approach (38, 24) . 178
Ultimately, regulatory scholars argue that the development of an analytical framework 179 capable of identifying and critically analyzing these factors is a key challenge for future 180 research given its potential to generate new range of policy relevant insights into HTA 181 processes, how they work and how they can be improved. 182 183
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the potential of this frame to deliver insights 184 into national HTA systems: in this case, Sweden. We conducted a qualitative case study 185 of key national agencies engaged in the Swedish process for HTA with a view to 186 uncovering salient points at which HTA processes either work well, or require attention. 187
Broadly, we found that the powers of the Swedish County Councils to levy taxes and 188 finance the provision of healthcare at the regional level place limits the role of national 189 HTA agencies in delivering cost effective health services. In Sweden, the major 190 challenge for national HTA IRAs is much less about discovering 'best practice' methods 191 and optimum evidential requirements, and much more about successfully communicating 192 national findings and negotiating their uptake at the regions. health of all residents [40] . Critically, the councils have the power to levy income taxes 204 on their residents and are not dependent on the national government for income. At the 205 local level, the councils exist on a parallel basis with municipalities, which are 206 responsible for the provision of public education, aged care and child care, infrastructure 207 and utilities within their areas. Like the councils, the municipalities also hold the power 208 to levy income taxes [40] . 209 210
The significant responsibilities and powers of the municipalities and councils have 211 important historical and cultural roots. Historically, the majority of the Swedish 212
1
The first two sections of the paper appear similarly in other papers published by this research group [XXXXXX] . This is due to the fact that we have conducted this research together and have developed and applied the theoretical framework for analysis jointly.
population has resided in provincial areas, which are characterized by cultural, religious 213 and legal differences. Within these areas, health care has been the historical concern of 214 the functioning regional public authority. From about the seventeenth century, rural 215 cities took responsibility for employing medical doctors within their communities. 216
Established in 1862, the Swedish county councils adopted health care provision as one of 217 their principal duties, and took responsibility for all aspects of health care [40] . based on the analysis of reimbursement applications presented by the product 282 manufacturers [46, 47] . Since 2002, the TLV has also maintained the list for the National 283 Drug Benefit Scheme, which it continues to review and revise [48] . 284 285
Consistent with its role of coordinating prices and access across the regions, the TLV 286 uses a value-based pricing model of assessment, under which the price of a drug reflects 287 its value to patients, rather than its production costs or costs in other countries. The TLV 288 expresses the cost-effectiveness of pharmaceutical technologies in terms of costs per 289 quality-adjusted life-years, or QALY [41] . Critically, the TLV has no role in establishing 290 guidelines for the use of new technologies. Its sole remit is to make reimbursement and 291 pricing decisions within 120 days of the receipt of the manufacturer's submission [49, 292 50] . These decisions apply across the regions. And today, the TLV is also responsible 293 for monitoring the pharmacy market with regard to the implementation of decisions [41] . 294 295
The Swedish Council on Health Technology Assessment (SBU) evaluates ethical and 296 social consequences of medical technologies alongside considerations of clinical and 297 cost-effectiveness. SBU assessments involve multidisciplinary teams of 10-15 national 298 and international experts [44, 8, 51, 52] . However, the SBU has no regulatory function. 299 SBU synthesizes research findings, providing focus on the clinical aspects of new 300 technologies and also their ethical, economic and social implications [51] . Essentially, 301 the SBU publishes procedures for the use of new technologies including diagnosis, 302 treatment and management of conditions [41] . Usually, it completes appraisals within 303 two to three years [49] . In 1996, however, the SBU developed the SBU-Alert program 304 for the purpose of delivering more rapid and policy relevant assessments of medical 305 innovations within six to twelve months [49] . 306 307
However, given the authority of the councils over budgets and its own lack of a 308 regulatory function, a key issue for the SBU is the extent to which its activities actually 309 succeed in influencing practices and policy at the regions [53, 54, 55] . Having the power 310 to raise taxes independently of the central government, the country councils enjoy 311 significant levels of autonomy regarding the uptake and use of medical technology [44] . 312
And to some extent, they replicate the functions of agencies like the SBU at the regional 313 level. Today, the councils are establishing 'mini-HTA-organizations' within their 314 governance structures for the purpose of evaluating health technologies. from regulatory approval to use in clinical practice were interviewed, and carefully 332 selected to represent the Swedish government at both the national and regional level. 333
These agencies included: the Ministry of Enterprise (MoE), the TLV, the SBU, the SBU-334
Alert programme, the NBHW, the IHE, the NCSP, the SDA, HTA-centrum and the 335 Region Västra Götaland (see Table 1 Sources at the SBU also remarked on the increasing number of organizations currently 376 engaged in the production of information on new pharmaceutical technologies at the 377 regions. For example, the SBU is responsible for the conduct of systematic reviews on 378 new technologies. However, these reviews were also being conducted by the IHE, IHA, 379 HTA-centrum, Metodrådet and other local HTA-agencies. Sources at the SBU 380 questioned the sophistication of these reviews. "They all have started doing assessments 381 nowadays…but… I would say that the SBU is the only one doing HTA in a proper way" 382 (SBU-A). 383 384
With the dramatic increase in the numbers of agencies actually conducting HTA research, 385
The National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies (Apoteket AB) cited the difficulties of 386 extracting a distinct lesson: "there are so many actors… the risk is that these views…may 387 contradict each other if one doesn't cooperate" (Apoteket AB). The existing system "is 388 overly complicated…it is good if one coordinates even better the different initiatives" 389 (Apoteket AB). In order to extract clear messages from the wide variety of agencies 390 engaged in the HTA process, Apoteket AB had "set up a separate group" within their 391 organizational structure "to draw conclusions from studies…follow the literature and the 392 development, looking at the SBU-reports, go through the recommendations of the 393 NBHW, the MPA's recommendations …and put it all together" (Apoteket AB). 394 395 SBU informants saw a role for the central government in resolving differences between 396 organizations national and local organizations through a clearer specification of 397 institutional responsibilities. "We want the government to give very clear tasks to the 398 different agencies" (SBU). They suggested that the national government had a role in 399 ensuring that "duplicate work is not done" (SBU-A). Government needed to "centralize 400 this work to one agency", and thereby "increase the quality [of assessments], because 401 then it would be done in the same way" (SBU). Despite these admonitions, however, we 402 also found that the structure of Swedish government, and the considerable authority of 403 the county councils over the provision of health care, actually limited the capacity of the 404 national government to centralize the work being conducted at the regions in one national 405 agency. 406 407
(
ii) Producing Coordinated Messages 408
For example, the multiple sources at which HTA information was being produced had 409 prompted some national agencies to engage with each other towards the production of 410 coordinated research messages. At the time of interview, the SBU was in regular 411 communication with all national agencies, the TLV, NBHW and the MPA, in order "to 412 prevent us from giving different messages" (SBU). Likewise, the NBHW also 413 coordinated the release of its reports with the SBU with the aim of ensuring better uptake 414 of the guidelines at the regions. As one informant reported, "we try…to have a good 415 timing with SBU Alert reports and our own production so that we take advantage of the 416 basis [of the SBU's report]" (NBHW). The NBHW recognized the importance of 417 communication and co-ordination when conducting appraisals in similar areas to other 418 organizations. In these cases, informants identified a requirement to co-ordinate both the 419 timing and substance with other agencies. For its part, the SBU also made significant 420 efforts to communicate findings "both nationally and regionally" (SBU-A). Specifically, 421 the SBU engaged in outreach exercises, employing external experts to take research 422 messages to the regions. Informants suggested that experts needed to act as ambassadors 423 for SBU research. They are "the quality leaders within the area…. when they go back to 424 the health care after finishing their report, they are one of the best ambassadors of the 425 report" (SBU-A). The TLV was also engaged in communication exercise with the 426 regions. The councils were a particular focus for the TLV, "we always work together 427 with them in our decision-making" (TLV) Further, the TLV also communicated results 428 to stakeholder-organizations at the regional level: "We send our agenda memorandum to 429 all the organizations; patient organizations, county councils, different…organizations that 430 are affected by or could be affected by our decisions. And so, I do believe there is a fair 431 chance for everybody to get informed" (TLV). 432 433
Although informants cited the willingness of organizations to communicate with each 434 other; they also doubted the effectiveness of their communication strategies. For their 435 part, SBU informants reported that the impact of HTA research messages at the regional 436 level was often closely associated with the remit of the agency performing the analysis, 437 "different people, different groups and agencies, might come back with quite different 438 evaluation of the evidence" (SBU). In addition, the various forms of technical language 439 associated with the conduct of HTA also complicated the reception of reports at the 440 regional level. Often enough, the sheer size of SBU reports functioned as a barrier. 441
Currently, the length of the SBU' reports tends to be "500 pages typewritten, which is not 442 very useful" (SBU). Agencies needed to "improve on the way we present the data to 443 make it more palatable for the health care professionals" (SBU). guidelines" (NBHW). Like the NBHW, the SBU is also interested in the influence 464 patients groups have on decision-making: "They are quite powerful these days. The 465 politicians are listening to them…they're gaining more and more influence" (SBU). In 466 addition, the SBU was also focusing on professional organizations, which have a 467 significant influence on research uptake "…that's why we try to uses the professional 468 organizations…as…external expert in our reports" (SBU). By including professionals in 469 the conduct of HTA "we know that whatever we say is based on…the group of 470 professionals which are going to use the knowledge or use the product" (SBU). 471 472
iii) The Absence of formal Regulatory Powers 473
Given the significant responsibilities of the country councils over the provision of health 474 care, national agencies also lacked necessary regulatory powers and organizational 475 resources to ensure the uptake of HTA research at the regions. For example, national and 476 regional bodies worked to different time frames. At the regional level, the councils were 477 critical of the SBU's lengthy work schedules: "one can criticize SBU for these very long 478 processes, three years and so on, that's much too long" (HTA-centrum). And even 479 informants within the SBU suggested that the organization needed "to find a way to 480 produce the reports faster than we do today" (SBU-A). Informants reported that the SBU 481
Alert reports, which were purposefully introduced to provide information more quickly, 482
"take one year to write, which is way too slow" (SBU). 483 484
At the national level, agencies criticized the capacities of regional organizations to 485 conduct HTA. For example, sources within the IHE suggested that the councils lacked 486 the necessary competence to access the HTA-reports from the TLV. They should "adopt 487 some health economists" (IHE) for the purpose of strengthening both their interest in, and 488 their ability to understand, TLV reports. Equally, however, human resource capacitates 489
were also a key issue at some of the national agencies. At the SBU, external experts were 490 largely responsible for the conduct of all assessments. But the use of external assessors 491 also complicated the SBU's work schedule. Informants at the regions remarked that: 492 "there are people from the whole country who shall travel and who shall decide about 493 dates when they can meet" (HTA-centrum). For its part, the SBU acknowledged that 494 human resources and resource use were areas in which it "could really improve…by 495 letting the employers at the SBU do more of the work and put less on the external expert" 496 (SBU). External experts often "have so much other obligations to attend that they cannot 497 work focused on this report" (SBU). Moreover, the additional use of more external 498 experts in the quality assurance process following the completion of the report further 499 delayed the output of research messages "we have too many external people in the quality 500 assurance process, and I'm not sure that they add so much more quality to it, but it takes a 501 long time" (SBU). 502 503
At the national level, limited understanding of pressures on local budgets also restricted 504 the uptake of HTA research outputs at the regions. Specifically, national failures to 505 consider these pressures resulted in the production of HTA research that had little 506 relevance to the county councils in terms of both their interest and understanding of key 507 problems. In some cases, local policy-makers simply ignored national outputs. The fact 508 that "the budgets for the county councils are separate from the national budget" (MoE) 509 often meant that the financial priorities may differ at the regions: "they have regional 510 targets and local targets that can be opposite from the national targets. That can be 511 frustrating" (MoE). At the TLV, the sense of frustration was palpable. Informants 512 reported that the county councils managed a local budget, and that their focus was on the 513 budget, and "money…rather than cost-effectiveness" (TLV). While the TLV produced 514 research outputs based on cost-effectiveness per QALY, these outputs lacked relevance to 515 regional budgetary considerations. "On the national level, TLV understand value per 516 QALY, but don't understand budget…on the county councils' level…they only 517 understand what…budget is. They have no understanding of what value is" (IHE). The 518 lack of understanding of budgetary limitations at the regional level produced friction 519 between the TLV and the Councils: it "is a very specific conflict…in the Swedish health 520 care system" (IHE). As a consequence, county councils may, due to "pure budget 521 circumstances…take decisions that are not in line with what we say or what 522
Socialstyrelsen or the NBHW, recommends as the guidelines" (SBU). 523 524
Perhaps most significantly, the absence of formal regulatory powers acted against the 525 impact of national agencies across the regions. Having control of both regional health 526 care budgets and health care priorities, the county councils enjoy a high degree of 527 autonomy. As a result, the TLV, the NBHW and the SBU can only recommend policies. 528
For example, where the TLV recommends that "these drugs…are accepted by us and 529 should be subsidized, it might later get to the county council level…and then they say no" 530 (SDA). Further, informants at the IHE reported that "guidelines issued by the NBHW 531 is…not at all powerful…because it's more recommendations" (IHE). There is no 532 obligation for regional policy-makers to enforce them. The NBHW reiterated the point: 533 "we cannot decide. We can only recommend what should be done" (NBHW). Similarly, 534 the SBU also highlighted their advisory rather than regulatory role, "we don't have any 535 means to force our reports into the health-care, none whatsoever" (SBU-A). 536 537
Without means to enforce their recommendations, several agencies were engaged in 538 conducting assessments of whether or not their research outputs had actually been 539
implemented. For example, the SBU follows-up the transmission of research outputs 540 with implementation evaluations, which they currently conduct "by enquiries" (SBU-A). 541
For the future, informants reported that these exercises needed to become more rigorous. 542 SBU should conduct formal evaluations regarding the uptake of outputs that ascertain 543 "where we do succeed and where we don't succeed" (SBU-A). The NBHW also follows 544 up the transmission of research outputs with implementation evaluations: "after we have 545 published a guideline… we do a follow-up across the country…and see how the 546 recommendation are being followed" (NBHW). Although none of these procedures 547 were formalized, they indicate the broader uncertainty across the regulatory space 548 regarding the uptake of HTA research outputs. In general, there was widespread 549
consensus that current levels uptake of HTA-research needed to be lifted: "I think 550 implementation of the result is one thing that we need to…improve…it's not enough that 551
we do very good reports if nobody uses them in the way they're intended to be used" 552 (SBU-1). 553 554 6. Discussion 555
Potentially, comparative research can involve assumptions that improving methods and 556 processes for HTA is a straightforward task of surveying national approaches to HTA, 557 discovering commonalities and deducing best practice mechanisms and processes for 558 universal application. In this way, comparative research has a tendency to bracket 559 contextual concerns via an assumption that HTA is a two-fold process of assessment and 560 appraisal, in which IRAs sit at the interface of scientific knowledge and practical policy 561 making. Our research, by contrast, suggests that context in which IRAs for HTA are 562 embedded influences both their interactions with other agencies and the methods through 563 which they generate research outputs. 564 565
In Sweden, for example, the powers of the county councils to levy taxes and finance the 566 provision of health care at the regional level limits the role of national HTA agencies in 567 the delivery of cost-effective health services. Certainly, national HTA agencies produce 568 relevant information on the use of new pharmaceuticals, but the influence of this 569 information on regional health systems is uncertain. This potential for differences to 570 emerge between regional and national priorities serves to differentiate the conduct of 571 HTA in Sweden from its conduct in other European states. In Sweden, the national 572 government is unable to operationalize multiple mechanisms for pursuing cost 573 efficiencies within the system in an effective way, and must rely largely on the 574 production and uptake of cost effectiveness data. As we have argued elsewhere, in 575
France, by contrast, rigorous economic modeling techniques play little authoritative role 576 in the current framework for HTA (XX). And indeed, French policy makers harbor 577 strong doubts about the legitimacy and practicality of setting budget constraints on 578 financing health care service. The French approach to HTA is a consequence of the open 579 nature of the French national health care budget, the structure of its financing 580 mechanisms, and strong cultural values associated with ensuring unrestricted access to 581 care (XX). As a result, French IRAs for HTA pursue cost-effectiveness gains in the 582 system via that mechanisms rely on expert opinion rather than rigorous calculations of 583 cost per QALY currently operated by organizations like the TLV. In Sweden, however, 584 national agencies are unable to bring expert opinion to bear on the delivery of health 585 services in a coordinated way because they lack authority to decide regional health care 586 priorities. In order to have any influence over regional priorities, Swedish national 587 agencies have little choice but to rely on economic modeling and the production cost 588 effectiveness data, involving the use of QALYs, to maintain their relevance in the 589 regions. 590 591
The regionalization of health care funding is perhaps the most serious barrier to the 592 influence of national HTA agencies [49, 52] . In Sweden, the regions often work to 593 different perspectives, time frames and processes. For example, national HTA-594 organizations like the TLV evaluate the effectiveness of innovations from a societal 595 perspective based on cost per QALY [40;46, 48] . But the county councils are concerned 596 with maintaining their local budgets and are often less concerned with whole-society 597 notions of cost-effectiveness. Lacking powers to set regional priorities and to alter 598 regional budgetary contexts, national agencies must focus on producing cost-599 effectiveness data, which, at best, might serve to guide the decisions of regional policy 600 makers. And in such a case, it is perhaps even unreasonable to expect that Swedish 601 national agencies should play an authoritative role in deciding regional priorities given 602 their lack of responsibility for the delivery of health care services. 603 604
The point is that the responsibilities of the county councils for strategizing and financing 605 the delivery of regional health services raises serious intra-and extra-organizational 606 barriers at the national level, which limit the capacity of national IRAs to exercise 607 influence. Certainly, Sweden has solid levels of expertise for the conduct of HTA at the 608 national level. But, under the decentralized governance structure, the capacity of national 609 government agencies to deliver expert advice across the wider regulatory space is 610 debatable. The emergence and multiplicity of HTA IRAs at the national level, each with 611 different roles and remits, has no doubt exacerbated this issue. Today, national agencies 612 produce a wide and, as informants suggest, sometimes confusing array of research 613 outputs, which the county councils often elect to ignore. While national agencies are 614 busily engaged in communication exercises to harmonize and amplify the strength of 615 their research messages in the regions, doubts regarding the effectiveness of these 616 strategies remain. And while the fragmented national institutional environment might 617 benefit from government initiatives aimed at improving the coordination of national roles 618 and outputs-for example, policy-makers might consider centralizing the conduct of 619 systematic reviews in one national body by consolidating the TLV, the NBHW and the 620 SBU in a single government agency-there is no guarantee that the even consolidation of 621 these bodies would increase the appeal of national research outputs at the regional level 622
given the lack of national authority in the regions. 623 624 625
Such a finding sits well with other analysts who have suggested that bridging the gap 626 between HTA research and policy making is the most significant challenge facing 627
Swedish HTA organizations in contributing to higher quality health care [44, 52] While the key utility of a regulatory governance perspective on HTA is its capacity to 648 draw attention to a greater range of challenges and issues with direct relevance to 649 improving the conduct of HTA within national regulatory spaces; it achieves this end by 650 discarding many of the key assumptions the comparative approach. Essentially, a 651 regulatory governance frame takes a very subtle position with respect to instances of 652 diversity and difference. In the first place, it expects to find them; and in the second 653 place, it also hopes to build better methods and processes for HTA on the basis of this 654 expectation. The problem with the distinction between HTA as an assessment process 655 involving the structured analysis of a health-care technology, which is transferable across 656 state boundaries, and an appraisal process, in which the analysis is converted into policy 657 advice, is the implicit assumption that methods and processes are not connected, or in 658 other words, that HTA takes places within isolated and largely scientific institutions that 659 apply self-selected methods. On the contrary, our analysis suggests that the process 660 through which research outputs are converted into policy advice affects the process 661 through which these outputs are generated in the first place. Put another way, national 662 contexts often complicate the uptake of HTA methods and process. The point is that 663 policy makers need to develop regulatory solutions specifically tailored for national 664 circumstances. In Sweden, for example, policy makers might need to consider the 665 prospect of semi-autonomous regional HTA organizations operating with some element 666 of supervision from a methodologically rigorous national organization. 667 668 669 670 671 
